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I.  Introduction 
 
 Genetically modified organisms (GMO) and genetically modified foods 
(GMF) are a topic much in the news of late.  They arouse strong passions on the 
political front, and have proven a focus of passionate resistance by opponents 
and equally passionate support by those in favor.  There have been violent 
protests against GMO and GMF at meetings of the World Trade Organization 
(WTO) in Seattle in 1999, at the International Monetary Fund meeting in 
Washington D.C. in 2000, and again at the World Bank meeting in Genoa in 
summer of 2001.   
Consumer organizations and non-governmental organizations in many 
countries are seeking either an outright ban on GMO and GMF, or at the least 
much stricter regulation.  There is a widespread movement in many countries 
aimed at destroying GMO crops.  Opponents cite concern for the long-term 
health effects of such products, and claim that the products are not adequately 
tested by independent scientists.1  They also are concerned about destruction of 
bio-diversity, both of native plant species, and of animals and insects that feed on 
such crops.2  Another concern frequently expressed is the lack of transparency of 
testing and regulation of such products. 3  The movement is also motivated by 
antipathy to large multi-national corporations and their perceived growing control 
over agriculture and food.4  Concern for small farmers and moral reservations 
about manipulation of living things also play a role.5 
Proponents of GMO and GMF cite studies which indicate that GMO are 
safe.  Proponents also claim huge potential benefits for the world’s poor and 
underdeveloped countries.  GMO can be created which require less water, or 
grow in nutrient-poor soil.  GMO can be made to be pest-resistant, thus requiring 
fewer pesticides and herbicides than traditional varieties, while producing much 
larger yields.6  GMO can also be created with heightened nutritional content, 
which proponents claim as a further benefit for the world’s hungry and 
malnourished. 7 
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Distinction between GMO and GMF 
 This paper distinguishes between GMO and GMF, as they involve 
different issues, different risks and often different regulations.  GMO, in this 
context, refers to seeds and other agricultural products, grown as such.  They are 
living organisms created through genetic engineering. Scientists transplant the 
genes of one species into another to transfer desirable characteristics. GMF is 
food made from GMO.  GMF may be a living organism, such as a tomato or 
potato, or a food product made from GMO ingredients. 
 Issues arising in the context of GMO include the potential spread of GMO 
into either organically grown or traditional varieties of crops. This brings with it 
the danger of cross-pollination and the potential elimination of traditional and 
organic varieties, threatening bio-diversity. There is also a danger of cross-
pollination with weeds, creating “super-weeds”, which are resistant to herbicides 
and pesticides to the same extent as the GMO.8  Some GMO have been found to 
destroy beneficial fungus in the soil surrounding them.9  While related to GMF, 
the range of issues and concerns about GMO, and their potential regulation, are 
not the focus of this paper.  
 GMF are foods derived from GMO.  GMF includes grains and other 
products such as corn (maize), wheat, rice, soybeans, sugar beets and 
rapeseed.  The grains can be used as animal feed or processed into food, e.g. 
oil, tofu, bean curd or other products eaten by humans.  GMF also include 
produce eaten directly.  GMF produce includes tomatoes, squash, potatoes, 
radicchio, and melon. They have been modified for longer “shelf life”, slower 
ripening, resistance to freezing, resistance to pests and the like.10 
 Proponents of GMF claim that they are not proven to cause any ill effects 
to humans or animals. Increased yields, better field-to-market durability, better 
resistance to pests and improved appearance are benefits of GMF.  They cite 
particular benefits for developing countries, which need to feed their hungry and 
often lack the technology which makes possible the productivity achieved by the 
developed world.11 
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 Opponents of GMF cite concerns which include those mentioned by 
opponents of GMO.  Other concerns are more directly related to human 
consumption of such products.12  Foremost is allergenicity, as when a gene from 
a product to which many people are allergic is inserted into another species.13  
Another concern is toxicity, especially where the product has heightened vitamin 
content and the food is a staple of an area’s diet.14 Creation of antibiotic 
resistance by consumption of antibiotic resistant food is yet another issue 
raised.15 While some scientists agree that “first generation” GMF might be 
considered safe, the “new generation GMF,” which may include multiple gene 
manipulations and is therefore more complex, poses potentially graver risks.16 
Aside from general health-related concerns, opponents of GMF also resist them 
on grounds of moral or ethical scruples, and on the basis of the consumer’s right 
to know what they are eating.17 
 Against this politically highly charged atmosphere, multinational fora and 
national governments have begun to take steps to regulate, and in some cases 
ban, GMF. 
 
A.  Recent History of Regulation of GMF 
 The recent approach to regulation of GMF can be characterized as 
predominantly unilateral, with a fragmented international approach.  One reason 
for this is the speed with which the technology has been developed and 
commercialized.  The past ten years have seen a boom in the bio-technology 
industry and in the marketing of GMO and GMF.18  International fora have not 
kept pace with these developments, nor, in many instances, have the attitudes of 
consumers.19  
 The U.S. has been foremost in adopting the science, followed rapidly by 
other major grain-exporting countries, such as Brazil, Argentina and Canada.  By 
2001, 50 varieties of GM crops had been approved in the U.S.  Millions of acres 
of cropland in the US are planted in GM crops.20  Reports indicate the same for 
Brazil.21  In such countries, there is a strong business and governmental interest 
in promoting export of GM crops, with corresponding liberal regulation of them.   
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 Other countries have been slower and more reluctant to adopt the new 
biotechnology for crops.  This is driven in part by consumer resistance, and also 
in part perhaps by a more cautious attitude to novel foods.22  Regulation of GM 
foods is more restrictive in these countries, with both planting of GMO and use of 
GMF either banned or subject to significant restrictions.23  The EU has imposed a 
complete ban on the import of any GM products since 1998.  Japan, New 
Zealand, Australia, Switzerland and the EU have all implemented or begun 
regulation of GMF, mostly through labeling schemes and an approval process for 
import or commercialization of GMO and GMF.24  
 International fora have begun to address the issues of GMF only relatively 
recently.  One result of this is that there are a number of potential trade conflicts  
brewing.  These will occur between exporting and importing countries. Those 
countries which have most aggressively adopted GMOs and GMF find 
themselves increasingly unable to export their products.25  The largest and 
arguably most important potential dispute, and the one on whch most 
commentary has centered,  is between the US and the EU.  Both the Clinton and 
the current Bush administration have pressured the EU to modify or drop its 
proposed labeling requirements for GMF, pressure which the Europeans have 
staunchly resisted.26  To analyze the potential outcome of such disputes, it is 
necessary to look in more detail at the current state of multilateral and national 
GM regulation. 
 
II. Current State of GM Regulation 
 
A.  Multilateral approaches to and discussions of GMF 
 
 There are four main fora which are involved in regulation of GMF, or in 
studying the current state of the field. Some are more directly concerned with 
GMO than GMF; however, all have discussed regulation of GMF.  These include 
the UN Codex Alimentarius, the Cartagena Protocol to the Convention on 
Biological Diversity, the OECD Working Parties on Safety of Novel Foods and the 
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WTO. Some potential regulations from these fora could have significance for any 
trade violations claimed before the WTO.  A brief overview of the relevant 
provisions is provided below. 
 
1.  UN Codex Alimentarius 
 The Codex Alimentarius (Codex) is the UN body which sets guidelines for 
food safety. It currently has working parties considering drafts on conducting risk 
assessments for foods derived from technology, and on food labeling.27  As far 
as the Committee on Labeling of Foods Obtained through Biotechnology is 
concerned, there is still no consensus on the approach to take, and the drafts 
were returned to the parties for further discussion and comments.28  The Codex 
Committee is discussing three options:  
 Option 1:  label only if the food differs significantly from corresponding 
foods as to composition, nutritional value or intended use (preferred by the US, 
Argentina and others). 
 Option 2: includes most of option 1, with the addition that the labels must 
disclose the method of production of bio-technology-derived foods or ingredients. 
 Option 3: Label required if any genetically-modified material is used at any 
time in the production process (proposed by Norway and India)29. 
The Working Party is currently attempting to combine preferred aspects of 
Options 1 and 2.  According to the Committee’s report, there is still dispute over 
health concerns regarding GMF.  There is also strong concern for providing 
consumers with information about the food they eat, regardless of whether the 
food is considered healthy.  The guidelines to the Working Party indicate that the 
overall objective is to facilitate consumer choice.30  
 One potential problem for future resolution of trade disputes concerns the 
manner in which standards in the Codex are adopted.  Traditionally they have 
been by consensus, but as the issues become more political, so does the 
decision-making process.31  One concern voiced is whether the rules on labeling 
will be adopted by consensus, or by a majority vote.  The approach that Codex 
takes is significant for potential disputes under the WTO, as there is a 
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presumption of WTO consistency for measures taken in conformity with 
international standards, by which Codex is meant.32 
 
2.  Cartagena Protocol on Biosafety to the Convention on Biological 
Diversity 
 The Cartagena Protocol on Biosafety to the Convention on Biological 
Diversity33 (Protocol) was adopted in January 2000, with 67 countries and the EU 
as signatories.  It is currently in the ratification process, and will come into effect 
after 50 countries have ratified it.34 The US is not a party to the Protocol, 
although it was actively involved in the negotiation process.35  
 The provisions of the Protocol refer primarily to seeds and agriculture, but 
there are provisions which also have relevance for GMF. The Protocol covers 
only live modified organisms (LMO), not processed foods, and as such will have 
limited application to regulation of GMO.  However, many GMO are live foods. 
Produce such as GM tomatoes, squash or potatoes, and live GM grains which 
could be used as feed or seed, could conceivably fall under the Protocol 
provisions.  
 Provisions relevant to GMF include labeling provisions which apply to 
GMO which are “intended as food or feed or for processing”.36  Article 18 
requires that GMOs which are intended for “direct use as food or feed, or for 
processing, be clearly identified that they ‘may contain’ GMO” and are not 
intended for intentional introduction into the environment.  Although not denoted 
as such, the Protocol thus has established a labeling requirement for GMF which 
are commodities. 37  Annex II spells out what information must be contained in a 
required notification to a Biosafety Clearing House set up to monitor GMO.  
Countries are permitted to regulate GMO and GMF following a notification and 
decision-making procedure outlined in articles 8 through 12.38  The Protocol 
specifically recognizes the precautionary principle, which is discussed below.39 
 The Preamble to the Protocol specifically preserves the parties’ rights 
under other international treaties, which means that in a dispute over whether the 
protocol or the WTO control, the WTO would likely take precedence.40  However, 
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the Preamble also provides that “the above recital is not intended to subordinate 
this protocol to other international agreements.”41  One commentator has argued 
that despite the savings clause, in the case of a conflict between the Convention 
and the WTO, the Protocol provisions could prevail42  The Protocol will apply to 
non-parties if they attempt to export to member parties,43 which means that non-
signatories such as the U.S. could be bound by the terms of the Protocol.  
 
3.  OECD Working parties and discussion 
 At the request of the G8, the OECD convened a conference on GM Foods 
in Edinburgh at the end of February, 2000.  It included more than 400 
participants from governments, non-governmental organizations, and industry.44 
The report of the conference highlighted a number of conclusions and concerns 
on which there was general agreement among the majority of the participants.  
These include the need for a more open and transparent debate on the topic of 
GM foods, and a science-based approach to the issues raised.45  Divisive issues 
on which there was little agreement included the extent to which participants 
regard issues surrounding GMF as inseparable from wider issues, such as 
environmental and moral concerns.  There was also continued disagreement 
about mandatory labeling of GMF, about the usefulness of feeding trials and on 
the process of assessing consumer concerns.46  
The Conference Chairman’s report to the G8 included his view that 
labeling would provide consumers with the ability to choose whether to eat GMF 
or not.  He also acknowledged areas of concern about testing.  A review of the 
“substantial equivalence” tool was recommended, as was a re-examination of 
methods for testing GMF toxicity and allergenicity.47 
As part of the conference, the OECD formed a number of working groups, 
building on a growing OECD expertise in biotechnology.  The OECD applies a 
science and rules-based approach to its research. The reports of working groups 
sent to the G8 include:  
OECD Taskforce for the Safety of Novel Foods and Feeds, discussing the 
consumer safety issues addressed by food safety assessors, including on-going 
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review and discussion of the principle of substantial equivalence as a safety 
assessment tool.  There is also specific mention of the need for greater post-
market surveillance of GMF to assess potential human health issues. 
OECD Working Group for the Harmonization of Regulatory Oversight in 
Biotechnology, reporting on environmental safety concerns regarding GM foods 
OECD Ad Hoc Group on Food Safety, reporting on national and 
international measures to address current and emerging food safety issues 
Summary reports from extensive consultations with Non-Governmental 
Organizations.48 
While non-binding, the OECD working group reports provide a further 
indication of the extent to which governments and multi-national organizations 
see a need to address emerging GM issues. 
 
4.  WTO Rules 
 The World Trade Organization’s regulatory scheme will be discussed in 
detail below.  For the purposes of this section, a brief overview of the general 
background of the WTO and the regulatory framework is offered. 
 The WTO is the successor organization to the GATT.  Founded after the 
Uruguay round of the GATT, the WTO was established by the Marrakesh 
Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization.49  The WTO is focused 
specifically on elimination of trade barriers. Its goals are non-discrimination, 
transparency, and a rules and science-based approach to resolution of trade 
disputes.50  Harmonization of countries’ trade measures is encouraged through 
reliance on international standards.51 
The WTO rules establish a notification procedure, whereby countries 
notify the WTO Secretariat of potential measures which may directly or indirectly 
affect international trade.  Other WTO members have the right to comment on 
such measures.  Once the measures are in force, any country which is negatively 
affected can request consultation with the member imposing the regulation.  
Should the consultations fail to be effective, the exporting country may then 
request that a Panel be convened to adjudicate the dispute.  If not satisfied with 
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the Panel’s decision, either country may request that an Appellate Body review 
the Panel’s decision.52  If the Panel or Appellate Body finds that a measure 
violates WTO trade rules, it recommends the nation concerned to modify the 
measure to bring it into compliance.  If the country refuses, the affected exporting 
country is then justified in imposing retaliatory trade sanctions.53 
Two particular Agreements under the WTO have particular relevance to 
potential disputes over labeling of GMF.  They are sketched briefly here, and 
discussed in more depth below.  
 The Agreement on the Application of Sanitary and Phytosanitary 
Measures (SPS Agreement) regulates measures taken to protect the life or 
health of humans, plants or animals.54  The SPS requires a scientific justification 
for the measure imposed, in the form of a risk assessment which is based on 
scientific evidence.55 It encourages countries to follow international standards set 
by bodies such as the Codex Alimentarius.56  If inadequate scientific evidence is 
available, the importing country may impose temporary measures.57  In any 
event, the measure imposed may not case discriminate among countries, and 
must be the least trade-restrictive measure possible.58   
 The Agreement on Technical Barriers to Trade59 (TBT Agreement) applies 
to regulations and standards which regulate the production, processes, 
packaging, labeling, etc. of both agricultural and industrial products.60  There are 
notice requirements to other members.61  Technical regulations may not 
discriminate between like products,62 and must not be more trade-restrictive than 
necessary to achieve their aims.63  The TBT Agreement also encourages the use 
of international standards, as long as they are effective to achieve the importing 
country’s objectives.64  Members shall also, so far as possible, recognize other 
countries’ regulations as equivalent.65  Provision is made for deviation from some 
of the requirements when necessary to protect safety, health or the 
environment.66  Members are required to adhere to a Code of Good Practice for 
the Preparation, Adoption and Application of Standards.67 
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 While many of their provisions are mirror images, the two Agreements are 
mutually exclusive.  A measure cannot fall under both Agreements 
simultaneously.68 
 
B.  Underlying Principles 
Three underlying principles are recurring threads running through 
multilateral regulation of GMO and GMF.  They are required for adoption of 
certain measures in some cases, and are offered as justification in others.  They 
are also a source of conflict.  These principles are the scientific principle, the 
precautionary principle and the principle of substantial equivalence. 
 
1)  Scientific Principle 
 The scientific principle requires that measures taken to restrain trade be 
based on neutral science.  While “science” is not specifically defined, references 
to it generally imply scientific practices, evidence and data that are verifiable69.  
In multi-lateral regulation of GMF, the scientific principle is expressed as the 
requirement for a risk assessment based on sound science.  All of the multi-
lateral fora discussed above require some form of risk assessment or science-
based approach.70  Risk analysis includes three components: risk assessment, 
risk management and risk communication.  
Risk analysis is a scientific assessment of the probability of risk, including 
determining what adverse effects could occur, and what the magnitude of the 
consequences could be.71 This first component also includes an assessment of 
the level of uncertainty as to the state of knowledge about both the adverse 
consequences and the likelihood of its occurrence.72  Uncertainty derives from a 
general lack of knowledge, and also from uncertainty as to causation, choices of 
variables in the data collection and the experiments, samples drawn and 
mathematical models chosen.73  Risk analysis is the subject of working 
committees to standardize approaches and assist developing countries with the 
technical aspects.74 
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The second component is risk management, defined as the process of 
identifying, evaluating, selecting and implementing actions to reduce risk.75  Risk 
management involves a decision regarding the acceptable level of risk, or what 
level of protection is deemed appropriate.76 This decision is a sovereign one 
involving domestic considerations of policy.  
Under SPS rules, countries are largely free to choose their acceptable 
level of risk, within the constraints of the SPS rules.77  One goal of the SPS 
Agreement is harmonization of member countries’ approaches to both risk 
assessment and risk management.78  One way the SPS Agreement attempts to 
achieve this is strongly to promote reliance on rule making bodies such as Codex  
Alimentarius.79  Both risk assessment and risk management loom large in WTO 
cases to date on food, animal and plant safety.  
The third component is risk communication. There is little written on risk 
communication, either in the commentaries or in the official bodies’ work on risk 
assessment. The notification requirements of SPS measures could conceivably 
be considered as part of risk communication. The EU has a position paper on 
Food Safety, including a section on risk communication.80  In the context of food 
safety, the European Union defines risk communication as making scientific 
opinions available as quickly and widely as possible.  The EU also stresses 
consumers’ need to have access to information on these issues, and states that 
the consumer must be viewed as a fully recognized stakeholder in the debate on 
food safety.81  One commentator argues strongly that adoption of science 
policies would increase transparency of the decisions underlying risk 
management, and this could also serve as risk communication.82 
 
2.  Precautionary Principle 
 The precautionary principle is more controversial than the scientific 
principle, and is not yet firmly anchored in world trade regulation. It derives 
originally from environmental law83 and is an important principle in the Cartagena 
Protocol.84  Its basic premise is that a country may err on the side of caution in 
the face of large uncertainty as to potential risks or risks of uncertain magnitude, 
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even without firm scientific evidence to support this.85  It may be described as a 
derogation from the scientific principle.   
The European Union, among others, relies on this principle86, while the 
U.S., among others, opposes its use in trade disputes over food safety.87  The 
EU regards use of the precautionary principle as part of risk management, in 
determining how much risk is tolerable.88  According to the EU, the precautionary 
principle plays no role in risk analysis, which must be science based.89  Rather, 
the precautionary principle comes into play where the political decision must be 
made as to the acceptable level of risk.  The EU states limits on the use of the 
precautionary principle, namely those which apply to risk management in 
general: proportionality, non-discrimination, consistency, cost/benefit analysis 
(including non-economic factors) and examination of scientific developments.90  
The Codex Committee on General Principles is currently working on 
harmonization of the definition and application of the precautionary principle.91  
 
3.  Substantial equivalence. 
 The third principle often used to assess food safety is that of substantial 
equivalence. This concept is endorsed by the FAO and WHO of the United 
Nations, and favored by the OECD.  Substantial equivalence is defined by the 
OECD as the “idea that existing organisms used as food, or as a source of food, 
can be used as the basis for comparison when assessing the safety of human 
consumption of a food or food component that has been modified or is new.”92  
One compares the trait encoded by the genetic modification, and compares it to 
an appropriate comparator in the traditional food.93  Establishing the similarity to 
a traditional food which is safe indicates that the new food will also be safe. 
OECD views this approach as the most practical in assessing GMF for food 
safety.94  
 Establishing substantial equivalence does not automatically mean that a 
novel food is safe, however. Substantial equivalence is not a safety assessment 
per se.95  Once a substantial equivalence assessment has been made, there are 
three possible scenarios which could arise: 1) If the products are nearly identical, 
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the novel product can be considered as safe as its traditional counterpart. 2) If 
equivalence is established apart from certain defined characteristics, risk 
analysis should focus on the identified differences, and 3) if no substantial 
equivalence can be established, a testing program would have to be 
implemented on a case-by-case basis.96   
 Substantial equivalence as a standard is under discussion in the Codex 
Alimentarius Committee on Food Labeling, with the US as a proponent.97 
Opponents of substantial equivalence point to the very fundamental difference of 
the product which contains DNA protein from another species.  They also point to 
the fact that many novel foods are patented as unique, and argue that they 
cannot then also be considered equivalent to non-GM varieties.98 
 There is an overlapping, sometimes inconsistent body of law regulating 
international trade, which will be applied to the potential disputes over labeling.  
There are also gaps in regulation due to the sometimes slow process of 
negotiating norms in multilateral bodies. In the absence of international norms 
specific to the topic, many countries have taken unilateral steps to regulate GMF. 
 
C.  National Regulation of and Labeling Requirements for Genetically 
Modified Foods 
 As might be expected from the foregoing, national regulation of GMF 
tends to divide along importer/exporter country lines, with exporting countries 
having little or no regulation of GMF, and importing countries attempting to 
restrict GMF. The regulatory schemes of the various countries, both those 
already adopted and those proposed, are outlined in brief below.   
 
United States 
 The US has an overlapping system of regulation of GMO and GMF, 
spread among a number of government agencies. The Food and Drug 
Administration (FDA) is charged with oversight of food safety, while the 
Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) is in charge of safety of pesticides, and 
the Department of Agriculture has responsibility for GM plants.99  With respect to 
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GMF, in 1992 the FDA published its “Statement of Policy: Foods Derived from 
New Plant Varieties”.100  This policy implemented a registration procedure for 
companies which plan to bring such foods to market.  The FDA recommends that 
developers consult with the FDA about bio-engineered foods under development. 
The company itself does the safety testing, and informs the FDA of its scientific 
and regulatory assessment of the food. FDA evaluates the submissions and if 
there are no difficulties noted, the product may be freely commercialized.  
Labeling is required only in exceptional circumstances, if the food differs 
significantly from the traditional variety. As of July 2001, the FDA website listed 
50 GMF authorized for production and sale. The official FDA policy is that GMF 
are safe, unless proven otherwise.  Companies conduct research, notify the FDA 
if there appear to be any problems, and bring their products to market. 
 In response to growing concerns among American scientists and 
consumers, in November 1999 the FDA convened public discussions about 
GMF.101  It has not yet made any changes in its policy or oversight based on this 
input, but issued a proposal in January 2001 for voluntary labeling guidelines for 
producers102.  However, there is growing public pressure for labeling in the US.  
Bills have been introduced in Congress to require mandatory labels.103  
Companies are beginning to label their products “non-GMO” in response to 
consumer demand.104 The FDA has warned five natural food companies that 
their “GMO-free” labels are misleading consumers.105  There is currently no 
approved text from FDA on what a label could say.106  Another example of 
growing consumer concern is evidenced by a movement in three towns in 
Vermont to vote on whether GMF should be labeled, and whether there should 
be a moratorium on them while they are studied.107 
 Thus while the official US policy and law is that GMF need not be 
regulated or labeled, there is a movement among consumers and lawmakers in 
the US to change this policy. 
 
 16 
Switzerland 
 Switzerland appears to have been the earliest country to impose a 
comprehensive approval and labeling regime for GMF.  In a 1992 referendum108, 
the Swiss approved a constitutional amendment regulating GMO and providing a 
regulatory framework. 109 A second referendum in 1995 brought about the 
adoption of regulations requiring that any GMF be approved before it is 
introduced into the market, and that all GMF be labeled.110  In its approach to 
approval and labeling, the Swiss legislature appears to have closely followed 
WTO rules.  
 Approval for GMF will only be granted if there is certainty, based on actual 
scientific knowledge, that the product poses no threat to human health. 111 The 
Swiss regulations call for both positive and negative labeling.  Since June 1999, 
a food product must be labeled “produced with GMO” if any of its ingredients 
contain more than 1% GMO.112 The reason given is to prevent deceptive 
practices and to allow consumers choice of what they eat.113 The same rationale 
applies to negative labels.  A product may only be labeled “produced without 
GMO” if three criteria are met:  1) none of its ingredients contain more than 1% 
GMO; 2) no GMO were used in the production or processing of the food and 3) a 
similar GM food or ingredient has been approved for the Swiss market.114 In 
other words, food may be labeled “non-GMO” only if there is danger of confusion 
with a GMF on the market. Labels proclaiming a product “GM-free” are not 
permitted, since it is believed that it is not possible to guarantee that a product is 
100% free of GM contamination.115 
 The Swiss regulations are intended to be fully compliant with WTO rules. 
Approval to introduce GMO or GMF into the Swiss market must be based on 
science. The regulations rely on international standards wherever they exist. The 
labeling requirements are designed to prevent deceptive practices and provide 
choice to consumers.116 
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European Union 
 The European Union has passed legislation requiring mandatory labeling 
for GMF.117  It requires pre-marketing notification to the country of import before 
the product is placed on the market.  Approval is based on an assessment of 
risk. A product must be considered “safe” to be imported.  The scientific data 
needed for assessment is to be provided by the seller.  Once a product is 
approved for sale by one EU member, it is free to circulate throughout the EU.   
GMF food products approved for sale in the EU require labels.  Labeling 
requirements are intended to provide information to consumers,118 for health 
reasons,119 for ethical reasons120 and to prevent them from being misled.121  A 
label is required if the GMF is no longer equivalent to an existing food or 
ingredient, as determined by a scientific assessment, if the food contains GMO 
that may have health implications for parts of the population, or may cause 
ethical concerns.122 There does not appear to be a minimum threshold of GMO 
that trigger the labeling requirement.  The criteria is whether the novel food is “no 
longer equivalent” to the existing food. In this case, a label is required. “No longer 
equivalent” is defined as a scientific determination that there are characteristics 
that are different, having regard to the natural limits of variation for such 
characteristics.123 
Negative labels are permitted.  Food that does not contain GMO may be 
labeled as such.124 
 
New Zealand/Australia 
 The two countries have a Joint Food Safety Regulation which forms a 
comprehensive program regulating GMO and GMF in both countries.125  The 
New Zealand Ministry of the Environment is the lead government agency 
administering the programs.  For space reasons, only the New Zealand program 
will be described in detail here.  
A Royal Commission in New Zealand was convened to study the various 
issues surrounding the introduction of GMO and GMF.126  Prior to convening the 
Royal Commission, no GMO or GMF had been approved for release.  During the 
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study, a voluntary moratorium on introduction of GMO and GMF was in place.  In 
addition to potential economic, medical and other benefits to be derived from 
GMO and GMF, the Royal Commission also inquired into areas of public 
concern. These included human health, environmental concerns, including 
biodiversity, and cultural and ethical concerns, with particular reference to ethical 
concerns of indigenous peoples.127   
The Commission ended in July of 2001 and legislation in New Zealand 
regarding GMF has been passed.  Regulation regarding GMF and GMO in New 
Zealand is governed by a number of laws, with different agencies having 
oversight over different areas.128 These include the Hazardous Substances and 
New Organisms (HSNO) Act of 1996, which is intended to protect the 
environment and health of New Zealanders.129 
 GMF introduced into New Zealand are regulated under the Food Act of 
1981 and a joint Australia New Zealand Food Standard (ANZFS). New Zealand 
requires GMF be assessed for safety by the Australia New Zealand Food 
Authority (ANZFA) and in most cases labeled, before it can be sold.130  If it 
contains a live GMO, such as a tomato with seeds, it must also be approved by 
the environmental agency.131  The food labeling rules came into effect in 
December  2001.  As of December 7, 2001, any food that contains more than 1% 
genetically modified material must be labeled identifying its GM status.132  Food 
already in stores need not be retroactively labeled, nor must food sold in 
restaurants be labeled. The exemption also includes highly refined foods where 
refining removes novel DNA and/or protein.  By December 7, 2002, any food with 
GM ingredients must be labeled.133  The labeling regime is considered by New 
Zealand to be in line with that of the European Union.134 
 
Canada 
 At present, Canada does not require labeling of GMF.  There appears to 
be quite a volatile debate within the government and among the citizens on 
whether labeling should be required. A bill requiring mandatory labeling on GMF 
sponsored by a private member was defeated in Parliament in October 2001,135 
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despite its support by the Canadian Minister of Health.136 The bill would have 
required labeling for any food containing more than 1% genetically modified 
ingredients.137 In August, 2001, the Canadian biotechnology advisory committee 
released an interim report that recommended a voluntary system of labeling, but 
the Minister of Health noted that there was no consensus on acceptable 
standards, such as the percentage of GM that would trigger a label.138 
 Debate on GMF continues among various sectors of Canadian society. An 
independent scientific panel of the Royal Society of Canada made a number of 
recommendations to the government regarding safety of GMO and GMF.139 The 
Canadian Wheat Board (CWB) has recommended a moratorium on introduction 
of GM wheat in Canada, largely to protect potential markets.140 The CWB’s 
position statement acknowledges consumer concern, and that overseas 
customers have expressed a disinclination to purchase GM wheat. The inability 
to adequately segregate GM grain from traditional varieties plays an important 
role. The CWB is working with the government committee developing voluntary 
labeling rules.141 A broad coalition of groups in Canada supports this position. Its 
members include the National Farmers Union, the Keystone Agricultural 
Producers of Manitoba and Greenpeace of Canada.142 Canada is a signatory to 
the Cartagena Protocol, and as such bound by its terms. 
 Although the current state of legislation in Canada does not require 
labeling for GMF, it appears that this might change in the future.  
 
South Korea 
 South Korea implemented a labeling regime for GMF which came into 
effect on March 1, 2001. The regulations are designed to implement South 
Korea’s commitment to the Cartagena Protocol.143  The law follows the Protocol’s 
“may contain” rule for possible GMO content.144  The law makes approval 
mandatory for the importation, production or research of GMOs. The law also 
requires retailers of genetically modified beans, corn and bean sprouts to label 
packing material, or lay signs beside them identifying them as genetically 
modified, if they are not packaged.145 The same provision applies to processed 
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foods based on GM beans, corn and bean sprouts as of July 2001. As of March, 
2002, potatoes are also included.146  According to the Ministry of Agriculture and 
Forestry, the purpose of the rule is to provide consumers with information on 
agricultural products,147  
 
Brazil 
 The situation regarding GM foods and products in Brazil appears to be 
confused and fraught with political struggles. The sale of GM products is 
currently forbidden, although there are areas where experimental plantings are 
permitted.148 Brazil is one of the few grain-exporting countries to have such a 
ban.  Sale of GM products was banned by a court order of 1998, until their 
impact and safety could be better studied.149 Despite such rulings, Brazil’s 
agriculture minister is apparently finalizing plans to approve commercial use of 
five different types of GM soy.150 His announcement prompted a warning from a 
federal judge that such products are still currently banned in Brazil.151 Other 
news reports indicate that there are large plantings of illegal GM grains in the 
growing areas of Brazil.152 
A presidential decree issued mid-July of 2001 provided that effective 
January, 2002, labeling on GM foods would be required if the percentage of GM 
ingredients is over 4%.153 This decree was immediately challenged in court by 
the government’s attorney general and a consumer group, as violating the 
Brazilian consumer defense code. The reason given was that it does not provide 
enough information or protection.154  It is thus unclear what direction Brazil will 
eventually take, given the political struggles between consumers and judges on 
one hand, and the government on the other. Brazil has traditionally sided with the 
US, Argentina and other growing countries in negotiations on labeling and 
regulation of GM foods.  
 
Japan 
 Japan implemented a labeling program for GM foods as of April 1, 
2001.155  The stated purpose is to provide consumers with the information they 
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demand about GM status of the food they buy, in response to their growing 
concerns about GMF.156  The labeling program includes both positive and 
negative labels.  From April 1, 2001, soybeans, corn, rapeseed, cottonseeds and 
potatoes must be labeled as to their GM status.  In addition, 24 kinds of 
processed foods derived from these ingredients, such as tofu and bean curd, 
must also be labeled.157  US-grown tomatoes will be included next.158 
 Labels must state GM-free, GMO foods, unknown or undecided.159  The 
threshold for being “GM-free”, for corn and soy products, is 5%.  Anything over 
5% requires a GMO foods label.  
 In addition to the GMF labeling program, the Ministry of Health and 
Welfare has instituted a mandatory food safety inspection program, replacing the 
previous voluntary program.  The purpose is to determine whether imported food 
is GMF or contains GM ingredients.160  The safety inspection is to be provided by 
third parties before the food is exported, and the Japanese Ministry of Health and 
Welfare will conduct spot audits to determine compliance.161 
 
Other countries 
 There are reports of other countries beginning to consider GMF labeling. 
At the most recent Codex meeting, India indicated that it is developing a labeling 
scheme in line with its proposal to the Codex, i.e. labeling required for any food 
containing GM ingredients or GM processes.162  China, Taiwan, Russia, South 
Africa and Mexico are also mentioned in news reports as beginning to consider 
labeling for GMF.163 
 
Summary 
 Overall, there is a growing trend toward labeling, especially for purposes 
of consumer information and choice. Safety concerns are also a factor.  The 
labeling schemes in general appear to parallel the more moderate proposals 
being considered in the Codex Alimentarius working parties. They are also often 
framed to comply with the Cartagena Protocol.  The threshold requirements to 
trigger labeling range from 1% to 5%, and include both GM food eaten directly 
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and food made with GM ingredients. Those countries requiring labeling make up 
a large percentage of the food importing countries in terms of volume. The result 
of any dispute between GMF exporting countries and importing countries 
requiring labeling is thus likely to have widespread consequences. 
 
III.  Dispute Before the World Trade Organization 
A.  Applicable Law 
 In a dispute over labeling of GMF brought before the WTO, which would 
be the applicable law?  Either the TBT Agreement or the SPS Agreement could 
conceivably be applied, depending on the terms of the complaint and the 
regulatory framework that is challenged. Commentators do not appear to have a 
uniform opinion. One argues that the TBT Agreement would appear to apply to 
any labeling mandated for general consumer information.164  Others suggest that 
either the TBT Agreement or the SPS Agreement could conceivably be used, but 
that in the end, only the SPS Agreement could apply.165  Yet another discusses 
labeling requirements solely under GATT Art XX (b) and (g).166  In discussing the 
potential of relying on GATT XX or GATT III, other commentators cite the 
principle of lex specialis, and argue that therefore the SPS Agreement would 
apply.167  At least one official in the United States appears to assume that a 
challenge would be brought under TBT rules.168   
 In discussing a potential dispute, there is one important unknown.  This is 
which international standard would be applied, if any.  The standard is significant 
because of the WTO presumption of compliance if parties rely on international 
standards in drafting measures.  The Codex has not yet finalized its rules on 
labeling, as they are still being debated.  The labeling battle may well be won in 
this arena, rather than before the WTO.  The labeling rules described above 
could enjoy a presumption of compliance, depending on which labeling option is 
chosen in Codex.  The Cartagena Protocol has also provisions for labeling, but it 
is generally considered unlikely this would be considered an international 
standard on which labeling countries could rely, assuming they are signatories.169  
Some regulatory schemes, for instance South Korea’s, are drafted to comply with 
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the Protocol provisions.  A labeling country could make a case that reliance on 
the Protocol’s rules should provide the same presumption of compliance as 
reliance on the Codex rules.  If a case is brought before the Codex has issued its 
labeling rules, uncertainty as to outcome is increased.  
 The relevant provisions of both the SPS Agreement and the TBT 
Agreement, as well as the case law interpreting them, are discussed below, to 
determine under which provision a challenge to labeling regulations should be 
brought.  Thereafter, the provisions of the labeling regimes described above are 
analyzed for their conformity to the applicable Agreements, and a determination 
is made whether they would withstand a challenge under either the SPS 
Agreement or the TBT Agreement. 
 
B.  SPS Agreement 
 The first agreement under which a challenge to labeling regulations could 
be brought is the SPS Agreement. To date, only three cases have been decided 
by the WTO under this Agreement:  EC Measures Concerning Meat and Meat 
Products170 (Hormones), in 1998; Australia – Measures Affecting Importation of 
Salmon171 (Salmon), also in 1998, and Japan – Measures Affecting Agricultural 
Products172 (Agricultural Products), in 1999.  All three concerned import bans of 
products under health and safety regulations of the importing country.  Hormones 
involved sanitary measures designed to protect human health, Salmon involved 
measures to protect animal health, Agricultural Products concerned a 
phytosanitary measure to protect plants against pests.  Many of the same issues 
were litigated in all three cases, and there is thus a body of case law interpreting 
the SPS Agreement.  In all three cases, the importing country lost, and its 
measures were found to be not in compliance with WTO rules.  Broadly 
speaking, lack of a proper risk assessment in each case was found.  The 
measures taken were also not based on the risk assessment that was 
performed.173 
  
Application of SPS Agreement 
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 A threshold issue is whether the SPS Agreement applies to labeling 
regulations intended primarily for consumer information purposes.  Art. 1.1 of the 
SPS states that it applies to “all sanitary and phytosanitary measures which may, 
directly or indirectly, affect international trade.”174 Sanitary and phytosanitary 
measures are defined in Annex A of the SPS Agreement.  They include any 
measure applied: 
  
1. to protect animal or plant life or health…from risks arising from the entry,  
establishment or spread of pests, diseases, disease-carrying organisms  
or disease-causing organisms; 
 
2. to protect human or plant life or health….from risks arising  
from additives, contaminants, toxins or disease-causing  
organisms in foods, beverages or feedstuffs 
 
3. to protect human life or health….from risks arising from diseases  
carried by animals, plants or products thereof, or from the entry,  
establishment or spread of pests; or 
 
4. to prevent or limit other damage….from the entry, establishment or  
spread of pests.175 
 
The SPS is thus intended to regulate measures that limit the importation of 
disease and pests and their spread, and to protect against risks arising from 
contaminants, additives and the like. The Annex defines “contaminants” to 
include pesticide and veterinary drug residues and extraneous matter.176 The first 
question is whether the labeling regulations discussed above include such 
measures and therefore fall under the SPS Agreement.  
 Those countries whose labeling regulations are described above generally 
regulate GMF in two different ways. The first is an approval process governing 
the import, marketing and research of GMO and GMF, which requires a risk 
assessment by the importing country to determine if they are safe. The second is 
a separate regulation requiring labeling of GMF, once they are approved for 
import or commercialization. Switzerland, the EU, Australia/New Zealand and 
Korea all have separate requirements for approval and for labeling. Japan has a 
food inspection regulation to determine GMO status, and a separate labeling 
regulation. In analyzing whether labeling regulations fall under the SPS, it is 
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necessary to distinguish them from the accompanying rules regarding GMO or 
GMF approval.  
 The approval processes described in the regulations above are all based 
on “science” or a risk assessment, presumably to conform to the WTO rules as 
outlined in the Hormones, Salmon and Agricultural Products cases.  The labeling 
rules, on the other hand, do not appear to be safety- or science-based, and their 
purpose is generally stated to be to allow consumer choice, provide consumer 
information, health information or information for those with religious or ethical 
considerations. 
 
Approval Processes 
 Proceeding from the definition provided in Annex A, it is open to 
discussion whether the approval regulations fall under the SPS Agreement.177  
The regulating countries do not appear to be regulating because they consider 
GMO a pest, disease or disease-causing organism.  The approval regulations 
are thus not caught by definition 1, 2 or 4.  Nor do labeling countries appear to 
consider GMO a contaminant, toxin, disease-causing organism or additive, and 
they are thus most likely not caught by definition 3.  Transgenic products are sui 
generis, which may be either a curse or a blessing, in terms of litigation before 
the WTO.  They are new and different, and are not included in the traditional 
categories of dangers regulated under the WTO rules.  In the multilateral 
standard-setting bodies, GMO and GMF are also not being discussed in terms of 
contaminants, etc.  It would be difficult for producing countries to argue that GMO 
and GMF fall under these categories, as they claim that GMF are equivalent to 
traditional foods and completely safe.  It is difficult to picture how the complaint 
would be framed, if a violation of the SPS Agreement is claimed.  According to at 
least one commentator, if the measures are not intended to protect against one 
of the named risks, then the measure is not an SPS measure.178  
 The most likely definition of GMO would be as an additive, if a Panel 
wanted to view the definitions expansively.179 Approval to sell, import or research 
could be refused under the regulations outlined, and a challenge of this decision 
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brought before the WTO.  Assuming arguendo that the regulations requiring 
approval to import or market GMO and GMF are covered by the SPS Agreement, 
this does not necessarily mean that the labeling regulations which accompany 
them are also subject to the terms of the SPS Agreement.  
 
GATT Regulations  
If there is a gap in the SPS Agreement, a complaining country could still 
fall back on the GATT provisions.  SPS case law indicates that such an approach 
is possible, and commentators have also addressed the GMF issue in terms of 
GATT requirements.  The GATT provisions strive for equal treatment of imported 
goods through application of non-discrimination principles.180  There are two 
aspects to these: 1) non-discrimination by an importing country among importers 
and 2) non-discrimination between imported goods and domestic like-
products.181  A violation of either of these rules may provide the exporting country 
with a legitimate complaint under GATT rules.182  The question would then arise 
whether the approval provisions discussed above are discriminating between 
“like” products or among importers.  At least two commentators argue that in the 
case of GMF, there would be no discrimination, since a proper reading of GATT 
art. III (4) makes clear that GMF and traditional foods are not “like”.183  The 
argument is that the genetic modification creates a completely new product, and 
is thus correctly distinguished from the traditional product.  
There is also a health and safety exception to the GATT non-
discrimination rules.  Art XX provides a list of exceptions.  In the case of the 
approval process for GMF, the importing country would most likely rely on GATT 
art. XX(b), the health and safety exception that was the forerunner of the SPS 
Agreement.  The art. XX exception states: 
 Subject to the requirement that such measures are not applied 
 in a manner which would constitute a means of arbitrary or 
 unjustifiable discrimination between countries where the same 
 conditions prevail, or a disguised restriction on international trade, 
nothing in this Agreement shall be construed to prevent the adoption or 
enforcement by any contracting party of measures: 
  
b) necessary to protect human, animal or plant life or health….184 
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The requirements for imposing the art. XX (b) exception are thus that it be 
“necessary”, not discriminate arbitrarily and not be a disguised restriction on 
international trade.185  In order for a measure to be considered “necessary” it 
must be the least trade restrictive alternative available.186  The question to be 
resolved would be whether the approval processes outlined above constitute 
unnecessary or discriminatory measures, or a disguised barrier to trade.   
The arguments could conceivably take a number of different tacks.  Many 
of the approval processes are modeled on the procedures required under the 
Protocol . It is open to question whether measures which comply with a multi-
national environmental treaty can be considered discriminatory, even against a 
country which is not a party to it.  Regarded in this light, they would not be 
considered unilateral measures, which has been important to the GATT panels in 
the past.187  The approval processes are designed to be rules and science 
based, which should eliminate the argument that they are discriminatory.  Certain 
commentators argue that such measures would be considered merely the 
operational requirements of a non-protectionist scheme for health regulation, and 
that there is no element of discrimination between domestic products and 
imports.188  All GMF are regulated the same.  Opponents of the approval 
requirements will certainly argue that since there is little to no domestic 
production of GMF in the regulating countries, the measures are clearly a 
disguised barrier to trade.  By regulating only GMF, the importing countries are 
giving an unfair advantage to domestic traditional production.   
The GATT practice has traditionally been to construe Art XX narrowly in 
favor of trade and against nontariff barriers to trade.  Crucial issues will be 
whether the approval processes are considered discriminatory and whether the 
GMF are considered “like” traditional counterparts.  It is thus possible that the 
approval measures could fail a challenge under GATT art. XX, but on balance, 
the approval processes should withstand the challenge. 
 
Labeling Requirements 
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The labeling requirements which are the focus of this paper must be 
analyzed separately from the approval processes.  None of the labeling 
regulations described is intended to prevent the introduction or spread of pests, 
diseases etc.  Nor are they intended to regulate or prevent the presence of 
contaminants, toxins, additives or disease-causing organisms.  Unlike the 
Hormones, Salmon and Agricultural Products cases, which cited specific dangers 
the measures in question sought to avert, the regulations discussed above make 
no mention of any of these specifically.  There is a common provision in each 
regulation that once the GMF is approved for sale or production within the 
country, it is presumed safe.  Labeling is a separate issue done for different 
reasons.  
The Swiss regulation is intended to prevent deceptive practices.189  The 
purpose of the South Korean regulation is to provide information to 
consumers.190  The only regulation with an overt reference to safety is the EU191, 
which requires a label if the novel food contains material not present in an 
equivalent food, and which may have health implications for certain sectors of the 
population.192  This presumably refers to the allergenicity issue.  The EU also 
states that its legislation is intended to prevent consumers from being misled.193 
Based on the definition of sanitary measures in Annex A to the SPS, and 
the specific terms of the labeling regulations considered, it is doubtful that the 
SPS Agreement would apply to the labeling regimes proposed.  The measures 
covered by the SPS Agreement are those intended specifically to combat 
disease, pests and the like, and to regulate toxins, additives and contaminants.  
The labeling provisions proposed do not address these issues, and are intended 
to serve a different purpose.  The labeling provisions considered alone are not 
subject to the SPS Agreement, and also do not appear to be covered under the 
art. XX(b) exception of the GATT discussed above.194  This then raises the issue 
of whether the labeling regulations would be regulated under the TBT 
Agreement. 
 
C.  TBT Agreement 
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 To date, there have been no cases brought before the WTO under the 
TBT Agreement, which leaves a number of open questions as to its potential 
interpretation.195  Not only has the TBT Agreement itself not yet been the subject 
of interpretation, its precursor, the Tokyo Round Agreement on Technical 
Barriers to Trade, was also never the subject of a ruling by a panel.196  There is 
thus little indication how some of the more important provisions might be 
interpreted.  The only case linked to the TBT Agreement is the Asbestos case, 
which was ultimately not decided on the basis of the TBT Agreement, but rather 
on GATT art. III:4 (discussed above)  However, comments by the Appellate Body 
in Asbestos give some insight into factors they might consider important in the 
future.  
 
Application of the TBT Agreement 
 The TBT Agreement applies to both industrial and agricultural products.197 
It covers technical rules related to product characteristics, processes, production 
methods, packaging and labeling.198  The TBT Agreement is intended to prevent 
such technical regulations from being a disguised barrier to trade.199  Legitimate 
objectives to be achieved by technical regulations are listed in Art. 2.2.  These 
include: “protection of national security, prevention of deceptive practices, 
protection of human health or safety, animal or plant life or health, or the 
environment”.200  This is not a closed list, and other legitimate objectives are 
possible.201  While health and safety are mentioned, these are not the main focus 
of the TBT Agreement.  If the measures are designed solely to protect health and 
safety, then the SPS Agreement is the proper rule.202  Regulations are defined in 
Annex 1, Art. 1 as a  
document which lays down product characteristics or 
their related processes and production methods, …with  
which compliance is mandatory.  It may also include or deal  
exclusively with terminology, symbols, packaging, marking or 
labeling requirements as they apply to a product, process or  
production method.203 
 
The labeling regimes in question are mandatory, and they apply to both the 
product characteristics and to the production method of the GMF in question. 
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From a textual standpoint, the TBT Agreement covers mandatory labeling 
requirements.  They would be considered a technical regulation under the 
definition provided in Annex 1, Art. 1.  From the apparent intent of the various 
labeling framers as well, they should be considered technical regulations. 
 
Legal Requirements 
 To conform to the TBT Agreement, a regulation must meet six legal 
criteria.  First, imported products must be treated no less favorably than “like” 
domestic products, and “like” products from other countries.204  Second, 
regulations must be no more trade restrictive than necessary to achieve their 
objectives.205  Third, the regulations must be based on international standards, to 
the extent they exist or are imminent, unless they would not permit the 
achievement of the objectives sought.206  If there is no standard, or the technical 
regulation in place derogates from it, there is a requirement to notify other 
members what the regulation requires.207  Fourth, with a view to harmonizing 
measures, countries must recognize other members’ measures as technically 
equivalent, if those measures meet the stated objectives.208  Fifth, members shall 
ensure that all technical regulations adopted are promptly published.209  Sixth, 
members are responsible for ensuring that all subsidiary governments conform to 
the TBT Agreement if they also set technical regulations.210  In addition, 
members are responsible for ensuring that their government standard-setting 
bodies adhere to the Code of Good Practice for the Preparation, Adoption and 
Application of Standards.211  Of these, only the first three are likely to be the 
object of dispute if a case is brought before the WTO.  The remaining three are 
more housekeeping measures, and should not be cause for conflict.  
 
Application to Labeling Schemes 
The next point is consideration of the labeling rules discussed above, with 
regard to whether they meet the legal requirements of the TBT Agreement.  In 
case of challenge, on what basis could they be overturned?   
Are they “like”? 
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 “Likeness” of products will doubtless be one of the most difficult points 
argued.  What is “like”?  Is it substantial equivalence, or something else?  There 
is no Panel or Appellate Body decision interpreting “likeness” under the TBT 
Agreement.  However, “likeness” is a term that is used throughout the GATT, and 
the Appellate Body in Asbestos was at pains to discuss the concept of “likeness” 
in detail.  As the Panel hearing Asbestos declined to consider Canada’s claims 
under the TBT Agreement, and made no findings of fact, the Appellate Body was 
unable to rule on potential violations of the TBT Agreement.212  Although the 
Appellate Body did not consider “likeness” in the context of TBT Agreement, the 
Appellate Body did outline the criteria which it, and other panels, have used in 
determining whether products are “like”.  
The Appellate Body began by determining that “likeness” has no specific 
definition, but must be determined through a case-by-case consideration of the 
provision which requires “likeness” and the circumstances which surround it.    
“Likeness” is a flexible word, and expands and shrinks like an accordion 
depending on the context.  The Appellate Body rejected the ordinary (dictionary) 
meaning of “like”, since it does not resolve three issues of interpretation:  1) 
which qualities or characteristics are important in assessing “likeness”; 2) the 
degree or extent to which products must share qualities or characteristics in 
order to be “like”; and 3) from whose perspective “likeness” is determined.213  
The Appellate Body then noted an approach for analyzing “likeness” that 
was developed in the context of GATT, and followed and developed by several 
panels and the Appellate Body since.214  The approved approach uses four 
general criteria in analyzing “likeness”:  i) the properties, nature and quality of the 
products; ii) the end-uses of the product; iii) consumer’s tastes and habits in 
respect of the products and iv) the tariff classification of the products.215  The 
Appellate Body elaborated on these categories, explaining that properties refers 
to physical properties, and that consumers’ tastes means the extent to which 
consumers perceive and treat the products as alternative means of performing 
particular functions to satisfy a demand.216  These criteria are interrelated.217  
The Appellate Body stressed that this is not the only means to approach 
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“likeness”, nor a closed list of considerations.  Nevertheless, it is apparently an 
approach accepted by many panels and Appellate Bodies.218  In the context of 
the Asbestos case, the Appellate Body paid particular attention to the chemical 
composition of the products involved, which differed significantly, and to their 
differing levels of carcinogenicity.  This might give insight into how a Panel or 
Appellate body would view the underlying characteristics of GMF. 
Whether GMF have similar physical properties to traditional foods of the 
same type will likely be vigorously disputed.  It will be argued that the mere fact 
that there are proteins from foreign genes makes their physical characteristics 
very different.  Indeed, the very reason they are bio-engineered is to have 
different physical characteristics.  The fact that they are often patented also 
indicates that they are not “like” ordinary food of the same type, or they would not 
be unique enough to qualify for patent protection.  The potential allergens and 
toxic elements they contain also indicates that their physical properties are not 
“like” traditional foods.  Particularly second generation GMF, which involve 
multiple gene transplants, are far removed from traditional counterparts.  
The counter-argument will be that GMF are substantially equivalent to 
traditional foods of the same type.  They have almost all of the same 
characteristics, indeed all of the key characteristics, and are simply enhanced.  
This is the position of the FDA in the US, and the reason they are freely 
marketed there.  The TBT Agreement also requires that where possible, 
technical regulations should be based on product requirements in terms of 
performance, not characteristics,219 and GMF “perform” the same as traditional 
counterparts.  The resolution of this will be a question of fact for the panel.   
Discussion of and resolution of whether substantial equivalence of GMF is 
accepted as the standard in Codex is an important consideration here.  If 
substantial equivalence becomes the standard, then the “like” issue could be 
resolved against labeling countries. This highlights once again the importance of 
the Codex rules, and the intensity with which countries on different sides of this 
debate will attempt to influence the discussions in Codex.  
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In regard to the second criteria, GMF are put to the same end-uses as 
traditional counterparts.  There should be no dispute about this. 
The third criteria, consumer perception, will also likely be a sticking point. 
The growing consumer demand worldwide for labeling indicates quite clearly that 
consumers do not perceive GMF and traditional counterparts as the same, and 
do not perceive GMF as an acceptable alternative to traditional food.220  At the 
least, consumers wish to be able to distinguish between the two before making a 
purchasing decision.  The counterargument is that this is based on irrational 
fears and has nothing to do with the reality of the science behind GM products.  
The rules are not provided for consumers to make irrational decisions.  
Consumer perceptions need not be based in science, nor does there appear to 
be a rational basis criteria for consumer perceptions.  In the Asbestos case, the 
Appellate Body did look at how consumers viewed the two products, at least from 
a relative safety standpoint, and this could be significant, and noted that ultimate 
consumers may have a different view of a product’s “likeness” than the inventor 
or producers of the product.221 .  
The last criteria, tariff classification, does not appear likely to be disputed.  
On balance, relying on criteria number one and three, a panel could 
justifiably find that GMF and traditional counterparts are not “like”.  If they are not 
“like”, a claim under the TBT Agreement should fail.  However, if other criteria are 
used, or these criteria are interpreted differently, and a finding of “likeness” is 
made, the question then becomes whether the regulation discriminates against 
“like” products. 
 
Are GMF discriminated against? 
 Article 2.1 TBT requires that “like” products be treated no less favorably 
than products of national origin, or like products originating from another country. 
As discussed above, whether GMF will be considered “like” is open to doubt, 
based on both the physical characteristics and consumer perception criteria. 
However, the TBT also applies a non-discrimination test.   
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The labeling rules discussed above describe a uniform policy regarding all 
GMF, both domestic and imported.  No distinction is made between imported 
GMF and domestic GMF, to the extent GMF is grown or produced domestically. 
The only criteria most of the regulatory schemes have for labeling seems to be 
the percentage threshold which triggers labeling.  The EU requires labeling only 
for products not substantially equivalent, but again does not discriminate 
between domestic or imported GMF.   
 The labeling rules do treat GMF differently from traditional counterparts, 
by requiring labels on GMO status.  The question is whether this is discrimination 
under the terms of the TBT Agreement.  If a country requires only “GMF” labels, 
is it more discriminatory than if they allow both “GMF” and “GMO-free” labels on 
all food, because they are singling out only GMF?  Under this analysis, the Swiss 
and the Japanese regulations would not be discriminatory.  Under the EU rules, 
as well, GMO-free labels are acceptable but apparently not required. It has long 
been accepted practice under GATT rules that countries can require labeling of 
country of origin on food and other products.  Labels providing information about 
the environmentally friendly practices of the producer are permitted.222  So are 
labels with information provided for religious purposes, such as kosher for 
observant Jews, hallal for devout Muslims or vegetarian for Hindus.  If these are 
acceptable, an argument could be made that labels as to GMO status are also 
acceptable.   
There is as yet no WTO panel interpretation of “treatment less favorable”, 
solely in the context of the TBT.  The GATT and WTO Panels and Appellate 
Bodies have discussed this requirement in the context of GATT art. III.  While the 
text of the TBT Agreement appears to focus solely on the issue of protection of 
domestic product against imported competition, it is likely that a WTO panel 
would interpret this requirement along the same lines as GATT panels have done 
in the past.  The requirements have traditionally been interpreted narrowly, in 
favor of trade and against non-tariff barriers.223.  The counterargument is likely to 
be that since the regulating countries have little to no domestic production of 
GMF, the labels are a disguised barrier to trade, implemented to protect 
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importing countries’ domestic agriculture and products.  It is thus possible that 
the labeling requirements could fail under this analysis.  Only if the regulating 
countries can convince a panel that there is no discriminatory effect, could the 
labeling requirements pass this hurdle. 
 
Least restrictive trade measure 
 The technical rules put in place must be the least trade restrictive possible 
to achieve the desired objective.224  The stated objective of most of the 
regulations examined is 1) to provide consumers with information about the food 
they buy and eat and, (for some countries) to provide safety and/or ethical 
information.  By definition, labeling is the most likely means to provide such 
information to consumers; an alternative does not come to mind.  If the TBT 
Agreement is interpreted similarly to the SPS Agreement, the burden of proof is 
on the complaining party to establish that there is another, less restrictive 
measure possible.225   
Even if a label is the least restrictive measure, another question arises. 
How much information is required on a label?.  At what point is there too much 
information, and how much information do consumers really need to have?  
Would it be adequate merely to put the country of origin on the label, or would 
this harm those exporters who are GM free as well as those who are not?  One 
argument made in favor of labels is that once consumers get accustomed to 
eating GM foods, their confidence in the products will grow; they would thus be a 
benefit to the GM industry. That some biotech companies are beginning to 
voluntarily label their products indicates that they see the wisdom of this point. 
Others ask whether such labels are not akin to a warning symbol on the 
product.226 
The labeling requirement in many countries replaces a complete ban on 
GMO and GMF227, and for others will provide for increased marketing of GM 
products.  Labeling could therefore be viewed as a measure promoting trade in 
GM products.  It is unlikely a complaining party would succeed if challenging this 
provision.  
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 Conformance to International Standards 
The lack of labeling rules from Codex has already been discussed.  Rules 
from Codex can hardly be said to be “imminent”, since Codex only meets every 
two years.  In the absence of international standards, members are forced to set 
their own standards.  However, the SPS case law has shown that there are risks 
to this approach.228    
The labeling requirements studied vary in their approach.  The Protocol 
requires that food or feed to be processed be labeled “may contain GMO”.229  
South Korea has implemented this standard.  In the context of the TBT 
Agreement, the question also arises whether adherence to the Cartagena 
Protocol rules would qualify a country for the presumption of compliance 
discussed in TBT article 2.4.  As discussed above, the short is answer is “most 
likely not”.  However, at least one commentator has argued that despite the 
savings clause, under a narrow interpretation the Protocol could prevail,230 while 
others have also noted the necessity for clarifying the intersection of the WTO 
and multi-lateral environmental agreements.231   
Many of the other labeling countries have gone beyond the Protocol 
standard in the level of detail they demand and the threshold imposed.  TBT Art 
2.4 allows members to derogate from international standards if they would be 
inappropriate or ineffective in fulfilling the member’s legitimate objectives.  Thus a 
country appears to be free to set a higher threshold than that required by 
international standards if necessary.  Under what standard a Panel would 
interpret such a threshold is another open question under the TBT agreement, 
and underscores yet again the importance of leveraging the Codex standard-
setting process to achieve a workable standard.  
 
Conclusion 
The TBT Agreement probably does apply.  There is a textual argument to 
be made for its application.  Labels are specifically mentioned as a technical 
regulation, and other labels are regulated here (nutrition, national origin, etc). 
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although there is no specific provision in the TBT for consumer rights.  However, 
the list of objectives cited is not a closed list.  There is an assumption by some 
opponents that the TBT Agreement applies.  Issues likely to be litigated are “like, 
“discrimination of “like” products and international standards. There are also 
fundamental disputes about the extent of consumers’ right to know.  While the 
labeling regimes are declared to be for the benefit of consumers, labeling 
opponents argue that their purpose is merely  to serve as a non-tariff barrier.   
It is doubtful that opponents of labeling could prevail on the issue of 
“likeness”, an issue which could prove to be decisive.  Labels are more likely to 
be viewed as a non-tariff barrier, at least under the GATT jurisprudence to date.  
The lack of international standards makes it even more difficult to predict the 
outcome.  The labeling rules as they are written appear designed to comply with 
the TBT Agreement, and on balance, should withstand a challenge.  
 
Conclusion 
 The issue of labeling GMF is politically divisive and likely to lead to trade 
frictions between countries which produce and export GMF and those importing 
countries which are attempting to restrict GMF.  A potential dispute before the 
WTO looms.  While often framed in terms of a conflict solely between the US and 
the EU, in fact labeling regimes are in place in many other countries, and thus 
the scope of a potential conflict extends beyond a trans-Atlantic dispute.  
Consumers from many countries, including an increasing number in GMF-
producing countries, are requiring more information about whether the food they 
eat contains GMF.  
Which WTO rules would apply to such a dispute is uncertain, although 
either the SPS Agreement or the TBT Agreement would be implicated.  The 
labeling rules examined in this paper appear to have been drafted to take 
account of the WTO case law to date, and to comply with multinational 
environmental treaties on GMF.  The labeling schemes would likely not fall under 
the SPS Agreement, as at least facially, the rules are not designed to deal with 
health or safety-related issues.  The TBT Agreement has never been applied in a 
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WTO dispute situation, so many questions about its interpretation and application 
must remain open.  A country disputing the validity of labeling regulations would 
challenge most successfully on grounds that they are a disguised barrier to trade.  
Based on prior GATT jurisprudence, however, and dicta from other cases, a 
country bringing a complaint against a labeling scheme could find a heavy 
burden of proof.  The best defense for countries implementing labeling  will be 
the issue of whether GMF are considered “like” traditional counterparts.  
Resolution of this question will turn largely on questions of fact and science 
presented to the Panel adjudicating.  Physical properties and the underlying 
makeup of the product are likely to be significant.  In addition, indications in the 
prior case law are that the WTO is inclined to give at least some weight to 
consumer views in regard to “likeness”.  This  may well prove to be a critical 
factor, as the avowed purpose of the labeling rules is to provide consumers with 
the information they need to make an informed choice about the food they 
purchase.  
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